National Decisions to Enter War (UMAP)
Author: Michael F. Altfeld & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
This module uses basic conditional probability, lotteries, and expected utility to analyze the process by which governments choose, when confronted with war, whether to join the stronger belligerent, join the weaker belligerent, or remain neutral. The necessary choice and utility theory are developed in the module.
Table of Contents:
INSTRUCTOR'S PREFACE
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE NATURE OF GOVERNEMENTS
3. DECISION-MAKING UNDER CERTAINTY
4. DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK
5. UTILITY AND RISKY CHOICE
5.1 Utility from Strategy: Relaxing an Assumption
5.2 Simplifying the Calculus
6. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL
6.1 Power
6.2 Utility from Outcome
6.3 Measuring Utility from Strategy
6.4 The Empirical Model
6.5 Testing the Theory
7. CONCLUSION
8. FOOTNOTES
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY
10. ANSWERS TO EXERCISES
Mathematics Topics:
Application Areas:
Prerequisites:
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